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Introduction 
The EU’s General Data Protection Regulation 2016/679 (GDPR),1 which went into effect on May 25, 
2018, governs the processing of personal data in Europe and promotes responsible data processing 
for a range of legitimate purposes.2 The GDPR contains specific provisions for scientific research that 
involves processing of personal data.3 These provisions clearly cover health research conducted by 
scientists at academic medical centers, pharmaceutical companies, universities, and other traditional 
institutions and organizations. However, it is unclear the extent to which these provisions, or indeed 
the GDPR as a whole, covers “citizen scientist”-led health research with mobile devices.  
“Citizen science” and “citizen scientists” are loose terms that describe individuals undertaking 
scientific research who are independent and disconnected from any institutional affiliation.4 The 
terms include patients and their family members who undertake scientific research through, among 
other platforms, consumer genetic testing, access to electronic health records, social media that link 
various individuals with similar health conditions, and use of powerful computer algorithms that can 
search through numerous and diverse sources of data.5 Not surprisingly, citizen science is generally 
not funded by any government agency. Funding, if it exists at all, comes from private sources such as 
personal savings and crowdfunding.  
Mobile devices, including smartphones and tablets, almost ubiquitously now include apps that 
collect health information, such as heart rate, blood pressure, blood sugar, and other 
measurements. At the same, using the internet to contact and communicate with large numbers of 
individuals, it has become increasingly common for various types of health research to incorporate 
mobile devices at the platform to collect and process personal data. Although citizen science-led 
health research with mobile devices holds some promise – some would argue this includes the 
democratization of science, increased possibility for serendipitous discovery (i.e. more “blue skies 
research”), and increased statistical power to generate findings (through brining more individuals 
together to share data) – it also raises some risks.6 These include the possible lack of consent from 
participants in research projects, inadequate privacy and security protections for sensitive data 
exchanged remotely or on the internet, questionable expertise to undertake scientifically rigorous 
and publishable findings, and even worsening of health conditions caused by improperly drawn 
conclusions about prevention and treatment options.7  
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In this article, we look at the risks associated with privacy protections through the prism of the GDPR 
(see Box 1 for key definitions in the GDPR). Given that the GDPR is an “omnibus” piece of data 
protection legislation that is intended to cover all sorts of personal data processing, it is presumed to 
cover citizen scientist-led health research. As will be discussed, however, there are potential 
exceptions in the law that may permit citizen scientists to escape the GDPR’s reach. In the following 
sections, and through a series of questions, we consider the possible application of the GDPR and 
potential implications for citizen science, specifically focusing on a relatively under-discussed 
provision called the “household exemption.” Ultimately, we argue that the GDPR likely does cover 
citizen science-led health research with mobile devices, depending on the specific context and the 
territorial scope. However, the remaining open questions that result from our analysis lead us to call 
for a lex specialis, such as a Code of Conduct for Health Research, that would provide greater clarity 
and certainty regarding the processing of health data by for research purposes, including by these 
non-traditional researchers. 
We begin our analysis by exploring the definition of personal data under the GDPR and whether the 
types of data processed in citizen science-led health research with mobile devices would fall under 
the definition.  
Box 1. Key definitions in the GDPR. 
Personal data: Any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (“data 
subject”); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in 
particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an 
online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, 
economic, cultural, or social identity of that natural person. 
 
Data processing: Any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data or on 
sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as collection, recording, 
organization, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure 
by transmission, dissemination, or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, 
restriction, erasure, or destruction. 
 
Data controller: A natural or legal person, public authority, agency, or other body which, alone or 
jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data. 
 
Data processor: A natural or legal person, public authority, agency, or other body which processes 
personal data on behalf of the data controller. 
 
Definition of personal data 
Among the several categories of data specified in the GDPR are categories defined by their 
identifiability of individuals. Here, three categories of data exist: personal, anonymous, and 
pseudonymous. Health data, as long as they are associated with an identified or identifiable 
individual, constitute personal data, and are therefore subject to the GDPR.8 Under Article 4(15), 
data concerning health is defined as “personal data related to the physical or mental health of a 
natural person, including the provision of health care services, which reveal information about his or 
her health status.” In the GDPR Recitals (i.e. the context-providing paragraphs that appear before 
the Articles), it is clarified that “Personal data concerning health should include all data pertaining to 
the health status of a data subject which reveal information relating to the past, current or future 
physical or mental health status of the data subject.”9 
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Conversely, anonymous data do not concern an identified or identifiable individual and are therefore 
not subject to the GDPR. As Recital 26 states:  
The principles of data protection should […] not apply to anonymous information, 
namely information which does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural 
person or to personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data 
subject is not or no longer identifiable. This Regulation does not therefore concern 
the processing of such anonymous information, including for statistical or research 
purposes. 
Should citizen scientists collect anonymous data, they need not comply with the GDPR. It is, 
however, not always straightforward to ascertain whether a set of health data are fully anonymous. 
If the data subject can be re-identified by “means likely reasonably to be used either by the 
controller or by any other person”10 then the data concerned would remain personal data. There 
have been various studies showing how seemingly perfectly anonymized health data can be re-
identified with additional information that is publicly available.11   
Finally, pseudonymous data are personal data that have been processed in such a way that the 
personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional 
information, provided that such additional information is kept separately and is subject to technical 
and organizational measures to ensure that the personal data are not attributed to an identified or 
identifiable natural person.12 Since pseudonymous data remain personal data under the GDPR, the 
GDPR applies even where the data in question has gone through pseudonymization.13 However, 
pseudonymization may help demonstrate compliance with requirements under the GDPR, such as 
making the secondary use of personal data compatible with the primary purpose,14 as well data 
protection by design15 and robust security measures,16 particularly in the context of scientific 
research.17 
In our view, health data collected through mobile devices is highly unlikely to qualify as anonymous 
data, as they are usually associated with a specific device, which de facto renders the individual 
identifiable, even without such details as the individual’s name or specific whereabouts. This 
position is supported by Recital 30, which states:  
Natural persons may be associated with online identifiers provided by their devices, 
applications, tools and protocols, such as internet protocol addresses, cookie 
identifiers or other identifiers such as radio frequency identification tags. This may 
leave traces which, in particular when combined with unique identifiers and other 
information received by the servers, may be used to create profiles of the natural 
persons and identify them. 
Thus, health data collected through mobile devices, including those that are pseudonymized, are 
most likely to fall within the definition of “personal data” and “data concerning health” under the 
GDPR. 
Territorial scope and the household exemption 
We must next consider the territorial scope of the GDPR, which has expanded the reach of European 
data protection law compared to the previous 1995 Data Protection Directive. Under Article 3, the 
GDPR applies to the processing of personal data in the context of the activities of an establishment 
(e.g. office or site) of a controller or a processor in the EU, regardless of whether the processing 
takes place in the EU or not. Hence, if a citizen scientist is conducting their research in the EU and 
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personal data are processed as part of that research, the GDPR will apply. The GDPR also applies to 
the processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the EU by a controller or processor not 
established in the EU, where the processing activities are related to: 
• the offering of goods or services, irrespective of whether a payment of the data subject is 
required, to such data subjects in the EU; or 
• the monitoring of their behavior as far as their behavior takes place within the EU. 
So, where health research is being conducted through a mobile or wearable device with users 
situated in the EU, even when the citizen scientist is situated outside the EU, in our view, the GDPR 
would apply, as the scientist is arguably monitoring the users of mobile devices, or even providing a 
service (namely, research involving the users, with results that are likely fed back to the user in real 
time). 
A more interesting question to consider in the citizen science context, though, is the GDPR’s so-
called “household exemption.” Under Article 2(2)(c), the GDPR states: “This Regulation does not 
apply to the processing of personal data: […] by a natural person in the course of a purely personal 
or household activity.” To put this in context, it may not be necessary for a mobile device to transmit 
any data beyond the confines of one’s device. If data processing only takes place on the device itself 
and no personal data are transmitted beyond the device to some third-party entity or processor, the 
GDPR would seem to not apply.  This is known as the household (or domestic) exemption and 
explained in Recital 18 of the GDPR: 
This Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data by a natural 
person in the course of a purely personal or household activity and thus with no 
connection to a professional or commercial activity. Personal or household activities 
could include correspondence and the holding of addresses, or social networking 
and online activity undertaken within the context of such activities. However, this 
Regulation applies to controllers or processors which provide the means for 
processing personal data for such personal or household activities. 
As two EU data protection law scholars comment:  
This notion [purely personal or household activity] should be interpreted based on 
the general social opinion and includes personal data that is being processed for 
leisure activities, hobbies, vacation or entertainment purposes, for the use of a 
social network or data that is part of a personal collection of addresses, birthdays or 
other important dates, such as anniversaries.18 
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has clarified the scope of the household 
exemption in a few cases, which, though handed down during the time of the previous 1995 Data 
Protection Directive, should remain valid law given the unchanged wording of the household 
exemption from the Directive to the GDPR. 
In the case of Bodil Lindqvist v Åklagarkammaren i Jönköping (Case C-101/01), the CJEU was asked to 
consider, among other questions, whether uploading personal data, including health data, onto an 
internet website by an individual can be regarded as outside the scope of 1995 Data Protection 
Directive on the ground that it is covered by one of the exceptions in Article 3(2), namely the 
household exemption. The CJEU ruled that posting data online about colleagues amounts to 
processing of personal data and cannot be exempted on the basis of personal or household 
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activities, as the details are “accessible to and indefinite number of people” on the internet. 
According to the Court:  
That [household] exception must therefore be interpreted as relating only to 
activities which are carried out in the course of private or family life of individuals, 
which is clearly not the case with the processing of personal data consisting in 
publication on the internet so that those data are made accessible to an indefinite 
number of people.19 
This reasoning was elaborated in the subsequent case of František Ryneš v Úřad pro ochranu 
osobních údajů (Case C-212/13), concerning the domestic use of a closed-circuit television camera 
(CCTV) around the front door of a family home, which happened also to capture partially images 
from a public street. Here, the CJEU was asked to consider, among other questions, whether the 
operation of a camera system installed on a family home for the purposes of the protection of the 
property, health, and life of the owners be regarded as outside the scope of the 1995 Data 
Protection Directive on the ground that it is covered by the household exemption, even though such 
a system also monitors, in part, a public space. Again, the CJEU maintained a narrow interpretation 
of what “personal or household activity” means: 
Since the provisions of Directive 95/46, in so far as they govern the processing of 
personal data liable to infringe fundamental freedoms, in particular the right to 
privacy, must necessarily be interpreted in the light of the fundamental rights set 
out in the Charter […], the exception provided for in the second indent of Article 3(2) 
of that directive must be narrowly construed.  
The fact the Article 3(2) […] falls to be narrowly constructed has its basis also in the 
very wording of the provision, under which the directive does not cover the 
processing of data where the activity in the course of which that processing is 
carried out is a “purely” personal or household activity, that is to say, not simply a 
personal or household activity. 
To the extent that video surveillance such as that at issue in the main proceedings 
covers, even partially, a public space and is accordingly directed outwards from the 
private setting of the person processing the data in that manner, it cannot be 
regarded as an activity which is a purely “personal or household” activity for the 
purposes of the second indent of Article 3(2) of Directive 95/46.20 
However, the CJEU also pointed out that the applicability of data protection law does not mean that 
such activities (i.e. CCTV around one’s home) are disallowed, as there are certain mechanisms 
provided by law whereby data controllers may possibly justify the collection and use of personal 
data through those activities.21 
The more recent judgment of Tietosuojavaltuutettu v Jehovan todistajat (Case C-25/17) upholds the 
criteria set out in the previous cases. In this case, the CJEU considered whether the collection of 
personal data by members of the Jehovah’s Witness Community constituted a purely personal or 
household activity within the meaning of Article 3(2) of Directive 95/46. Here, the facts concerned 
collecting personal data through door-to-door preaching of households. The CJEU held that: 
…an activity cannot be regarded as being purely personal or domestic where its 
purpose is to make the data collected accessible to an unrestricted number of 
people or where that activity extends, even partially, to a public space and is 
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accordingly directed outwards from the private setting of the person processing the 
data in that manner […]. 
…door-to-door preaching, in the course of the which personal data are collected […] 
is, by its very nature, intended to spread the faith of the Jehovah’s Witness 
Community among people who […] do not belong to the faith of the members who 
engage in preaching. Therefore, that activity is directed outwards from the private 
setting of the members who engage in preaching.22 
What we gather from these three cases is that the household exemption, both under the old Data 
Protection Directive and now the GDPR, is narrowly construed. Namely, only those activities which 
are purely personal or within a household may be exempt from the reach of the law. The GDPR has 
provided two examples of such activities: 1) correspondence and the holding of addresses (e.g. 
writing emails and maintaining an address book), or 2) social networking and online activity 
undertaken within the context of such activities (e.g. Facebook chat and postings within one’s social 
network). It is also made clear that any connection to a commercial or professional activity would 
preclude the activity in question from being purely personal or household.23 
The use of personal data for health research by citizen scientists is clearly not covered by the two 
examples provided by the GDPR, but it does not necessarily involve any commercial or professional 
interest, either. This means that the nature of such research activities and whether they can benefit 
from the household exemption are at least open to question. Provided that mobile devices monitor 
the health conditions only of the citizen scientists themselves and/or family members, and provided 
that such data are accessible only within the family and not transmitted to a third party or external 
device or processor (as otherwise the use of data will essentially break out into the “public space” 
and thus lose its “purely personal or household” nature), it would be plausible to argue for the 
exemption for such activities. As a Council of Europe handbook on data protection law observes, 
context matters in determining whether the household exemption applies:  
Citizens’ access to the internet and the possibility to use e-commerce platforms, 
social networks and blogging sites to share personal information about themselves 
and other individuals make it increasingly difficult to separate personal from non-
personal processing. Whether activities are purely personal or household depends 
on the circumstances. Activities that have professional or commercial aspects 
cannot fall under the household exemption.24 
In the case of “self-experimenters,” i.e. individuals who gather personal data about their own health 
and biometric measurements and then voluntarily attempt to experiment in some way to alter their 
health, it seems likely this activity would fall within the household exemption, provided these self-
experimenters used or disclosed their own data or findings to only a small number of individuals 
(e.g. a small social network of fellow self-experimenters). As the Council of Europe handbook states: 
“An individual who keeps his or her correspondence, a personal diary describing incidents with 
friends and colleagues and health records of family members, may be exempt from data protection 
rules, as these activities could be purely personal or merely household activities.”25 But as the same 
handbook goes on to note: “…another factor that must be taken into account is whether personal 
data are made available to a large number of persons, obviously external to the private sphere of 
the individual.”26 We know, based on the case law discussed above, that the household exemption 
will not extend to the publication of personal data to an unlimited number of recipients on the 
internet, as opposed to say, a small social network that is available to members only. In this 
scenario, the household exemption will therefore likely apply where individuals have performed an 
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experiment and in the course of doing so (including before and after the experimentation), process 
personal data and disseminate it to a small number of persons. However, were the “self-
experimenter” to disseminate their personal data to large number of persons; post personal data 
about other individuals; commercialize the findings in some way, such as selling results or holding 
him- or herself out for hire for guinea-pig testing; or otherwise undertake self-experimentations as a 
full-time activity, then it seems more likely that the household exemption would disapply.  
It should also be pointed out that that just because the self-experimenter is the data subject, or one 
of the data subjects, does not mean that they cannot be a (joint) data controller at the same time. At 
the time of the 1995 Data Protection Directive, there were discussions about social media users as 
data controllers jointly with the platform.27 Although much of the legal uncertainty in this context 
has been dispelled by GDPR Recital 18 (“[p]ersonal or household activities could include […] social 
networking […]”), there is no doctrinal reason why a data subject cannot be a data controller at the 
same time. In fact, the idea of “data subjects as data controllers” has recently been subject to 
further debates amid a number of CJEU cases,28 but further research is needed to clarify such a 
possibility in a setting of citizen science.  
Considering the CJEU’s consistently narrow interpretation of the household exemption in existing 
case law, other forms of citizen scientist-led research are unlikely to be exempted if they are 
challenged in legal proceedings. For example, collecting and analyzing behavioral data from 
smartphones, even only within a group of citizen scientists or a limited number of pilot users, can 
hardly be exempted as purely personal or domestic. This interpretation is in line with the Court’s 
reasoning that allowing such activities to fall outside the scope of data protection law would place 
individuals under serious data protection risks if the citizen scientists do not use such data with 
reasonable care. 
Thus, in our view, while the GDPR has not expressly precluded the possibility of relying on the 
household exemption, it would be difficult for citizen scientists to make such a case for their health 
research that processes health data using mobile devices beyond their own or their family 
members’. 
Lawful bases for processing personal data 
Having considered that the GDPR likely applies to most forms of citizen-scientist led health research 
with mobile devices (assuming either the citizen scientist and/or the users are based in the EU), we 
must now turn to consider which lawful bases might be appropriate to process personal data. It is a 
principle under EU data protection law that processing of personal data is generally prohibited 
unless it is based on one of the legal grounds explicitly afforded by law. This is particularly the case 
for certain special categories of data (i.e. “sensitive data”), including health-related data, which is 
the data type most likely to apply in this specific context.29 It should be noted that a number of legal 
bases applicable to personal data of general nature (“non-sensitive data”), such as “performance of 
a contract” or “legitimate interests” of the data controller,30 cannot sufficiently legitimize the 
collection and use of sensitive data. Since health data are undoubtedly sensitive data, this section of 
our article will only look into the legal grounds applicable to sensitive data. 
In the context of mobile device-driven health research carried out by citizen scientists, the following 
legal bases for processing sensitive data can be considered: 
• vital interests; 
• provision of health and social care; 
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• public health;  
• explicit consent; and  
• scientific research purposes.  
We assess the strength of each of these lawful bases below. 
Vital interests. Under Article 9(2)(c), sensitive personal data may be processed if it is “necessary to 
protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person where the data subject is 
physically or legally incapable of giving consent.” Despite the possibly valid argument that certain 
citizen science health research projects may concern the vital interests of individuals, especially 
those involving the development of treatment or medication for rare diseases, it is unlikely this legal 
ground can be invoked to justify the processing of health data. For one thing, Article 9(2)(c) sets out 
a strict condition that this is applicable only when “the data subject is physically or legally incapable 
of giving consent.” For another thing, the “vital” test requires an exceptional level of urgency, such 
as “monitoring epidemics and their spread or in situations of humanitarian emergencies” (Recital 46) 
or threats to “physical integrity or life” (Recital 112). In the absences of these elements, vital 
interests of the data subject or another personal are generally inapplicable as a legal ground. 
Provision of health and social care. Under Article 9(2)(h), sensitive personal data may be processed if 
it is: 
…necessary for the purposes of preventive or occupational medicine, for the 
assessment of the working capacity of the employee, medical diagnosis, the 
provision of health or social care or treatment or the management of health or 
social care systems and services on the basis of Union or Member State law or 
pursuant to contract with a health professional and subject to the conditions and 
safeguards referred to in paragraph 3 [in Article 9]. 
Paragraph 3 speaks to a person being subject to an obligation of secrecy under EU or Member State 
law or rules established by national competent bodies. While research carried out by citizen 
scientists may benefit from the provision of health and social care, this does not mean that the use 
of sensitive data is automatically justified. The conditions laid down by Article 9(2)(h) are rather 
stringent, requiring: a) a legal basis either provided by EU or Member State law, or by a health 
service contract; and b) such processing being subject to an obligation of secrecy as stipulated by law 
or regulation. Without such safeguards, the reliance on this provision would not be valid. 
Public health. Under Article 9(2)(i), sensitive personal data may be processed if it is: 
…necessary for reasons of public interest in the area of public health, such as 
protecting against serious cross-border threats to health or ensuring high standards 
of quality and safety of health care and of medicinal products or medical devices, on 
the basis of Union or Member State law which provides for suitable and specific 
measures to safeguard the rights and freedoms of the data subject, in particular 
professional secrecy.  
For the same reasons as above, public health is also unlikely to be a suitable lawful basis in the 
citizen science context. The applicability of the public health lawful basis depends on an existing 
legal basis provided by EU or Member State law, as well as the safeguards of legally stipulated 
professional (or other) secrecy. 
Explicit consent. Under Article 9(2)(a), sensitive personal data may be processed if “the data subject 
has given explicit consent to the processing of those personal data for one or more specified 
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purposes, except where Union or Member State law provide that the prohibition [of processing 
sensitive data] may not be lifted by the data subject.” At first glance, explicit consent seems to be 
the safest, if not the only, choice for citizen scientists with regard to mobile device-driven health 
research carried out using sensitive personal data. However, it should be noted that there are 
further complications regarding this ground. First, the provision specifically allows Member States to 
restrict the types of processing of sensitive data to which data subjects may consent. Second, Article 
9(4) also allows Member States to introduce further conditions, including limitations, with regard to 
the processing of genetic data, biometric data or data concerning health.31 Thus, while citizen 
scientists may be in a good position to obtain the explicit consent from users of mobile devices and 
who wish to participate in a research project, they must be mindful of national laws that may restrict 
either consent or processing of health-related data. 
Scientific research. Finally, under Article 9(2)(i), sensitive personal data may be processed if it is  
…necessary for […] scientific […] research purposes […] in accordance with Article 
89(1) based on Union or Member State law which shall be proportionate to the aim 
pursued, respect the essence of the right to data protection and provide for suitable 
and specific measures to safeguard the fundamental rights and the interests of the 
data subject. 
This is also a more promising lawful basis. However, it requires a basis in EU or Member State law. 
These laws may further stipulate that health research have research ethics committee approval.32 
This can pose a problem to citizen scientists, as unlike institutional researchers, they may lack a 
support structure that enables them to apply for and obtain research ethics approval, as well as 
helping them determine which ethics committee(s) to apply to for assessment and approval. 
Thus, most of the legal grounds provided by Article 9(1) are difficult to apply to the case of citizen 
scientist-led health research. The scientific research purpose provision at Article 9(2)(i) may be a 
possible route, but it would require authorization under EU or Member State law and may not be 
very helpful in the international research context where personal data are exported from the EU to 
third countries, such as the United States. The most practical basis would therefore seem to be the 
explicit consent basis at Article 9(2)(a), but due to the potential fragmentation of law across Member 
States (despite the GDPR’s desire to harmonize data protection law across Europe), even robustly 
obtained consent may suffer a high risk of legal uncertainty.33 
However, not all hope is lost. We now proceed to explore a provision in the GDPR which may prove 
to be a boon for citizen scientists and others wishing to undertake health research. 
Compatible use 
While collecting sensitive data for health research purposes can be a complex legal process in the 
EU, once the data have been lawfully collected for a primary purpose – which does not have to be 
related to health research – it should be much more straightforward for citizen scientists to reuse 
such data for research purposes. This is because GDPR Article 5(1)(b) – which states the data 
protection principle of purpose limitation – expressly recognizes the compatibility of scientific 
research as a secondary purpose, as long as the conditions set out in Article 89(1) are met.34 This 
means that even if personal data were collected for a different purpose, further processing of such 
data by the same data controller (i.e. citizen scientist) for research purposes will be considered 
compatible,35 and therefore will not require a separate legal basis.36 Accordingly, for citizen scientists 
to rely on this principle to reuse pre-collected health data, three conditions must be fulfilled: 
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1. The data concerned must have been lawfully collected in the first place. 
2. The processing must and must only serve the sole purpose of research. The GDPR 
acknowledges a broad definition of “scientific research,”37 including privately funded 
research, and there is no compelling reason to not accept citizen scientist-led research as a 
valid form of “scientific research.” 
3. Such processing must be in line with the requirements laid down by Article 89(1), in 
particular with appropriate safeguards to ensure compliance with the principle of data 
minimization.38 It should be noted that, unlike Article 9(2)(i) analyzed above, neither Article 
5(1)(b) nor Article 89(1) requires EU or Member State law to provide a legal basis. It follows 
then that where citizen scientists (as opposed to institutional researchers) have difficulty 
relying on Article 9(2)(i), they should be able to process already lawfully collected data for 
the secondary purpose of scientific research. 
In this regard, research activities carried out by citizen scientists are to some extent privileged under 
the GDPR, especially with regard to reusing lawfully collected data. Compared to institutional 
scientists, however, primary collection and use of health data with mobile devices remain legally 
challenging for citizen scientists.  
Conclusion and policy implications 
In this article, we explored whether the GDPR applies to citizen scientist-led health research with 
mobile devices. The analysis above shows that, depending on the territorial scope, citizen scientist-
led health research with mobile devices is likely to be covered by the GDPR. The GDPR’s household 
exemption is unlikely to apply unless the activities are solely “personal or household,” which would 
mean using mobile devices that process data only within the confines of the individual or their family 
members, and no personal data are transferred to third parties. Consequently, for citizen scientists 
to process health data collected by mobile devices, they would likely need to obtain explicit consent 
from data subjects, rely on the scientific research provision, or rely on the authorization provided 
under the purpose limitation principle with regard to scientific research. 
Despite the special provisions governing the use of personal data in the area of scientific research, 
the GDPR largely remains a one-size-fits-all, omnibus legal instrument. This provides benefit in terms 
of greater overall legal certainty for various stakeholders – including data subjects – but as a 
drawback, it may not offer sufficient granularity to deal adequately with the highly heterogeneous 
real-life scenarios in different contexts. In the case of health research, the GDPR does not 
differentiate institutional researchers and independent researchers (we are agonistic as to whether 
it should), although it leaves some room for Member State laws to step in and lay down more 
specific rules – and this is arguably a negative as it goes against the concerted drive for 
harmonization of data protection law. 
As a result, citizen scientists may find the GDPR both too strict and too lax. On the one hand, 
obtaining a legal basis under Article 9(2) other than explicit consent may be a challenge. On the 
other hand, once a data controller has lawfully collected sensitive data for a different purpose, they 
can reuse such data for the loosely defined purpose of “scientific research,” which could be 
exploited by not just citizen scientists, but also pharmaceutical companies. 
The implication for policymakers, whether in Europe or elsewhere, is that in the area of health 
research, there may be a need for a lex specialis to handle the issue regarding the processing of 
health data for research purposes (including by non-traditional researchers), which involves both a 
sophisticated coverage of distinct circumstances and the complicated balance among various 
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interests. To this end, we are encouraged by the work undertaken by the Biobanking and 
BioMolecular resources Research Infrastructure-European Research Infrastructure Consortium 
(BBMRI-ERIC), a European-based distributed research infrastructure, which is currently developing a 
“Code of Conduct for Health Research,” in line with GDPR Article 40.39 Such efforts may mark an 
opportunity to develop a set of standards to provide greater clarity and certainty regarding the legal 
obligations of citizen scientists to protect the privacy interests of those whose data they process 
using mobile devices for health research purposes. 
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